The effects of healthy aging, amnestic mild cognitive impairment, and Alzheimer's disease on recollection, familiarity and false recognition, estimated by an associative process-dissociation recognition procedure by Pitarque, Alfonso et al.
Neuropsychologia 91 (2016) 29–35Contents lists available at ScienceDirectNeuropsychologiahttp://d
0028-39
n Corr
versity
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/neuropsychologiaThe effects of healthy aging, amnestic mild cognitive impairment, and
Alzheimer's disease on recollection, familiarity and false recognition,
estimated by an associative process-dissociation recognition procedure
Alfonso Pitarque a,n, Juan C. Meléndez a, Alicia Sales a, Teresa Mayordomo a, Encar Satorres a,
Joaquín Escudero b, Salvador Algarabel a
a University of Valencia, Spain
b Department of Neurology, General Hospital, Valencia, Spaina r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 23 February 2016
Received in revised form
6 July 2016
Accepted 10 July 2016
Available online 13 July 2016
Keywords:
Familiarity
Recollection
False recognition
Cognitive impairment
Alzheimer's diseasex.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.07.0
32/& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
espondence to: Department of Methodology
of Valencia, Av. Blasco Ibanez 21, 46010 Valen
ail address: pitarque@uv.es (A. Pitarque).a b s t r a c t
Given the uneven experimental results in the literature regarding whether or not familiarity declines
with healthy aging and cognitive impairment, we compare four samples (healthy young people, healthy
older people, older people with amnestic mild cognitive impairment – aMCI –, and older people with
Alzheimer's disease – AD –) on an associative recognition task, which, following the logic of the process-
dissociation procedure, allowed us to obtain corrected estimates of recollection, familiarity and false
recognition. The results show that familiarity does not decline with healthy aging, but it does with
cognitive impairment, whereas false recognition increases with healthy aging, but declines signiﬁcantly
with cognitive impairment. These results support the idea that the deﬁcits detected in recollection,
familiarity, or false recognition in older people could be used as early prodromal markers of cognitive
impairment.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Research on the neurobiology of memory has led to the pro-
posal that there are different forms of memory supported by dif-
ferent neural structures. According to the dual-process theories
(e.g. Koen and Yonelinas, 2014; Schoemaker et al., 2014; Yonelinas,
2002), memory for a past experience can be based on a conscious
recollection of contextual details from that experience or on an
automatic estimation of the strength of that memory trace in the
absence of contextual details (a sense of “déjà vu” or familiarity).
These models assume that, whereas recollection is impaired in
normal aging, familiarity is spared (e.g. Koen and Yonelinas, 2014;
Prull et al., 2006; Yonelinas, 2002), or at least it is less affected
than recollection (Koen and Yonelinas, 2016). The neural sub-
strates of recollection and familiarity seem to be neuro-anatomi-
cally dissociated within the medial temporal lobe regions: re-
collection has been linked to hippocampal function, while famil-
iarity appears related to perirhinal cortex activity (e.g. Yonelinas
et al., 2010). In contrast to the dual-process models, the single-
process theories (also called signal-detection or global strength10
, Faculty of Psychology, Uni-
cia, Spain.theories; e.g. Dunn, 2004) propose that recognition is based only
on a quantitative estimation of the strength of the memory trace:
what dual models call recollection would refer to strong mem-
ories, while familiarity would be considered weak memories, with
the hippocampus being the neural substrate for both types of
memories (Wixted and Squire, 2010, 2011).
The processes of familiarity and recollection have mainly been
analyzed through three types of experimental procedures (see e.g.
Koen and Yonelinas (2014), Schoemaker et al. (2014) and Yonelinas
(2002), for an explanation): the remember-know (RK) paradigm,
the process-dissociation procedure (PD), and the analysis of re-
cognition memory receiver operating characteristics (ROC). Two
recent literature reviews (Koen and Yonelinas, 2014; Schoemaker
et al., 2014) have shown that there is unanimity in accepting that
recollection declines in both healthy aging (Koen and Yonelinas,
2014, 2016) and cognitive impairment (in patients with amnestic
mild cognitive impairment – aMCI – and Alzheimer's Disease – AD
–; Schoemaker et al., 2014). In fact, on screening tasks, recollection
deﬁcits are usually taken as the key prodromal marker for the
early diagnosis of pathological cognitive impairment (Petersen and
Morris, 2003).
However, the experimental results related to familiarity are not
conclusive and differ depending on the experimental paradigm
used and the degree of cognitive impairment. Thus, in healthy
aging, familiarity does not seem to be impaired in studies using
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procedure (see the recent meta-analytic review by Koen and
Yonelinas (2014); however, Koen and Yonelinas (2016), recently
found converging evidence for a preservation of familiarity using
the three procedures in a sample of older adults). With regard to
familiarity in aMCI patients, results are even less consistent. In
their recent review, Schoemaker et al. (2014) found six studies that
demonstrated a decline in familiarity, whereas ﬁve studies in-
dicated preservation. In AD patients, both recollection and famil-
iarity were affected (Schoemaker et al., 2014). Based on these re-
sults, some authors defend the idea of also using familiarity deﬁ-
cits as early markers of cognitive impairment (see, e.g., Koen and
Yonelinas (2014) and Wolk et al. (2008, 2013)).
Given these inconsistent results about the role of familiarity in
cognitive impairment, we want to propose an associative re-
cognition task that will provide a way to evaluate whether or not
familiarity declines with healthy aging and cognitive impairment.
On this task, subjects will have to simply decide whether pairs of
images presented on the recognition test appear as they were
studied earlier (intact pairs) or not (either because they were re-
arranged or because they are new). Our idea stems from recent
studies by Cohn, Emrich and Moscovitch (2008), Wolk et al. (2008;
exp. 1) and Wolk et al. (2013), who used the associative recogni-
tion procedure as an method for estimating both recollection and
familiarity, following the logic of the PD procedure (Yonelinas and
Jacoby (2012), for a recent review), given that the intact and re-
arranged pairs can be understood as the inclusion and exclusion
conditions of the PD procedure, respectively. Based on the rate of
“old” responses for intact and rearranged pairs, independent esti-
mates of recollection (R) and familiarity (F) can be calculated
based on the following (Wolk et al., 2008, 2013):
( ) ( )= –R probability intact probability rearranged ;
( ) ( )= −F probability rearranged / 1 R .
To account for differences between samples in their base rates
of false alarms (“old” responses to new pairs –FAN-), familiarity
should be corrected by subtracting each participant's FAN from his
or her initial familiarity estimate and expressing the difference in
terms of a discrimination measure (d′) derived from signal de-
tection theory (Cohn et al., 2008; Wolk et al., 2008, 2013).
In addition, this associative recognition task will allow us to
analyze the role that age and cognitive impairment play in false
recognition, given that for some authors it could be considered as
another early marker of cognitive impairment (e.g. Hildebrant
et al., 2009a, 2009b; Yeung et al., 2013). In this way ﬁndings from
several experimental paradigms provide concurrent evidence that
false recognition (and false memories) increases with age in
healthy older people (e.g. Buchler et al., 2011; Light et al., 2004;
McCabe et al., 2009; Norman and Schacter, 1997; Rhodes et al.,
2008), especially when items are perceptual or conceptually re-
lated (Yeung et al., 2013). The explanation that dual-process
models provide for this is that older people, due to the decline in
their recollection capacity, base their recognition less on re-
collecting contextual details and more on the activation of the
items (e.g. Kilb and Naveh-Benjamin, 2011; Prull et al., 2006;
Rhodes et al., 2008) or on the general similitude underlying the
information (or gist memory; Reyna and Brainerd, 1995). However,
several other studies have shown that false recognition is sig-
niﬁcantly lower in aMCI and AD patients than in healthy older
adults (but only after controlling for the basal level of false alarms;
e.g. Budson et al., 2000; Hudon et al., 2006), which has been in-
terpreted to mean that the gist memory of these patients is di-
minished (Budson et al., 2000, 2006a; Gallo et al., 2006; Hudon
et al., 2006). However, if we do not control the basal level of falsealarms, these patients can show false recognition rates that are
similar to or greater than those found in healthy people of the
same age (e.g. Balota et al., 1999; Watson et al., 2001) because they
tend to show a more liberal response bias than that of healthy
older adults (e.g. Budson et al., 2006b). Therefore, to control for
response bias, we will calculate the corrected false recognition
rates by subtracting the proportion of “old” responses to new lure
pairs (FAN) from the proportion of “old” responses to rearranged
lure pairs (e.g. Abe et al., 2011; Budson et al., 2006a, 2006b; Hudon
et al., 2006).
During the study task in our experiment, half of the pairs will
be presented once, and half of the pairs will be presented twice, in
order to manipulate the effect of pair repetition on recollection,
familiarity, and false recollection (e.g. Light et al., 2004; Rhodes
et al., 2008, exp. 3). It is well known that in young people, pair
repetition increases the hit rates for intact pairs because it
strengthens the association between the two items and increases
the activation of each item, making the pair more accessible to
recognition (Kilb and Naveh-Benjamin, 2011; Tussing and Green,
2001). In healthy older people, pair repetition also increases their
hit rates for intact pairs, but to a lesser extent than in young
people, as they show deﬁcits in both encoding (the associative-
binding deﬁcit hypothesis; see the meta-analysis by Old and Na-
veh-Benjamin (2008), for a review) and in recollection-based re-
cognition, and they tend to rely more on the activation of the
items (increased by repetitions; e.g. Buchler et al., 2011). Finally,
patients with cognitive impairment should show a more sig-
niﬁcant deﬁcit in their hit rates for intact pairs because they are
impaired in both recollection-based and familiarity-based re-
cognition (Gallo et al., 2004). Nevertheless, pair repetition also
increases false recognition, especially in healthy older people, as
stimulus repetition increases the familiarity of the items (Tussing
and Green, 2001), leading to more false alarms on rearranged pairs
(Light et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2008). However, young adults, as
their recollection-based recognition ability is intact, use practice to
enhance recollection and reduce their false alarm rates on rear-
ranged pairs (e.g., using the “recall-to-reject” strategy, which in-
volves rejecting a non-studied XY lure pair because the participant
can consciously recollect that stimulus X was associated with sti-
mulus Z during the study task, and not with stimulus Y; see Abe
et al. (2011), Cohn et al. (2008) and Gallo et al. (2004)). This “recall-
to-reject” strategy, where recollection combats familiarity in young
adults to reduce false recognition, has found extensive experi-
mental support (e.g. Abe et al., 2011; Buchler et al., 2011; Cohn
et al., 2008; Gallo et al., 2004; Light et al., 2004; Pitarque et al.,
2015; Rhodes et al., 2008). Thus, in our laboratory we recently
compared two samples of healthy older people, one with high
cognitive reserve and the other with low cognitive reserve (Stern,
2009), on an associative recognition task. We found that stimulus
repetition increased false recognition in the group with low cog-
nitive reserve, but not in the group with high cognitive reserve.
The interpretation of this result was that the former group based
its judgments more on familiarity, while the latter group made
better use of the “recall-to-reject” strategy in order to control the
effect of familiarity on false alarms (Pitarque et al., 2016).
However, the experimental results about the role that stimulus
repetition plays in the false recognition of patients with cognitive
impairment are far from unanimous. If the aMCI and AD patients
mainly base their decisions on the familiarity of the items, they
would also be expected to increase their rates of false recognition
with stimulus repetition, and this is precisely what has been
shown in studies like those by Abe et al. (2011), Budson et al.
(2000) or Gallo et al. (2004). By contrast, other studies have shown
that repetition does not affect false recognition in AD patients (see
e.g. Budson et al. (2002) and Schacter et al. (1998)), which has
been interpreted as indicating that these patients also seem to
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experimental data, our procedure will also allow us to analyze the
effects of repetition and healthy and pathological aging on false
recognition.
In summary, we propose an associative recognition experiment
(recognition of faces associated with everyday scenery; e.g. Kilb
and Naveh-Benjamin, 2011, exp. 2) in which half of the pairs are
repeated during the study task. This procedure will allow us to
obtain corrected estimates of recollection, familiarity and false
recognition. We will compare three samples of older people (with
30 people in each): one with healthy people, another with aMCI
patients, and the third with AD patients, matched on gender, age,
cultural level, verbal intelligence and depressive symptomatology.
A control group of healthy young people (N ¼42) is also included
to serve as a baseline to show the optimal level of memory per-
formance. Our main objective is to analyze whether familiarity
declines with healthy aging (comparing the samples of young and
older healthy people) and whether it declines with cognitive im-
pairment (comparing the samples of healthy older people vs aMCI
and AD patients), given the contradictory experimental data found
in the literature. We also intend to analyze whether the false re-
cognition of the aMCI or AD patients increases, remains the same,
or declines with the stimulus repetition, compared to what is
found in healthy older people, given the uneven experimental
results reviewed. The results will allow us to analyze whether
familiarity and false recognition could be used, along with re-
collection deﬁcits, as early markers of cognitive impairment.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
We compare four samples of volunteers consisting of: 42 young
people, 30 healthy elderly people, 30 amnestic mild cognitively
impaired (aMCI) older individuals, and 30 Alzheimer's disease
(AD) diagnosed patients (see Table 1 for demographic and neu-
ropsychological data). The young group was composed of under-
graduates at the University of Valencia (mean age ¼22.14 years,
SD ¼3.21, range 18–30 years old). The healthy elderly participants
were recruited from various senior citizen centers in the city of
Valencia (mean age ¼75.83 years, SD ¼5.63, range 67–90 years
old). The aMCI and AD elderly participants were patients from the
Neurology Department of the General Hospital of Valencia (aMCI
group mean age ¼77.07 years, SD ¼6.50, range 64–91 years old;
AD group mean age ¼80.03 years, SD ¼6.49, range 64–93 years
old). The three samples of older people were matched on gender,
age, cultural level, intelligence and depressive symptomatologyTable 1
Means (and SE) of demographic and neuropsychological data.
a. YOUNG (n¼42) b. HEALTHY OLDER (
Age 22.14 (.50) 75.83 (1.03)
Gender (male/female) 14/28 7/23
Education (1–4 scale) 4.00 (.00) 2.47 (.23)
WAIS Vocabulary 9.05 (.39) 11.33 (.44)
Mini Mental (MMSE) not applicable (n.a.) 28.40 (.28)
Depression Scale (CES-D) n.a. 14.22 (.43)
Verbal Learning Test Immediate n.a. 48.40 (.42)
Verbal Learning Test Delayed n.a. 10.20 (.10)
Verbal Fluency Test Categorical n.a. 21.20 (.22)
Verbal Fluency Test Phonological n.a. 31.7 (.36)
Digit Span Test Forward n.a. 7.40 (.04)
Digit Span Test Backward n.a. 4.00 (.06)
Visual Memory Test Immediate (Rey) n.a. 34.00 (.09)
Visual Memory Test Delay (Rey) n.a. 11.25 (.08)(see Table 1). Patients in the aMCI group met the diagnostic cri-
teria speciﬁed by Petersen (2004) and were all amnestic patients
(ergo with memory deﬁcits; see Table 1). Amnestic MCI patients
have been found to be at a greater risk of conversion to AD than
their non-amnestic counterparts (Schoemaker et al., 2014). Clinical
diagnosis was the end-result of an extensive evaluation, including
medical history and physical and neuropsychological examina-
tions, and it was determined by consensus between neurologists
and a neuropsychologist. Exclusion criteria for patients were:
signiﬁcant asymptomatic neurovascular disease, a history of pre-
vious symptomatic stroke, any medical condition signiﬁcantly af-
fecting the brain, serious psychiatric symptoms, or a history of
drug abuse. All participants (or close family members) gave writ-
ten informed consent for the study. The study was approved by the
institutional review board of the General Hospital of Valencia and
the University of Valencia.
All the participants performed the vocabulary subtest of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1997). All the
elderly people (both healthy and cognitively impaired) underwent
the following psychometric evaluation (see Table 1): the Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein and McHugh,
1975), the CES-D Depression Scale (Radloff, 1997), the Spanish
Verbal Learning Test (immediate and delayed; Benedet and Ale-
jandre, 1998), and the Categorical and Phonological Verbal Fluency
Test (Morris et al., 1989). Working memory was assessed with the
Digit Span Forward and Backward Test (Wechsler, 1987), and vis-
iospatial memory was assessed with the Construction Figure
Complex Test (immediate and delayed; Rey, 1941).
2.2. Materials
The same materials were used as in Pitarque et al. (2015,
picture pairs). They consisted of 64 ID-card sized color photo-
graphs (145160 pixels) of anonymous faces (16 of older men, 16
of older women, 16 of young men and 16 of young women) linked
to 64 color photographs of unknown everyday scenery (800600
pixels; e.g. Kilb and Naveh-Benjamin, 2011).
2.3. Procedure
The associative recognition task consisted of a study phase with
64 pairs of pictures and a recognition task with 60 pairs, with a
5-min break between them. In the study phase, 60 pairs of stimuli
(plus 2 pairs of distractors at the beginning and at the end, not
tested later) were presented randomly at the center of a computer
screen for 2.5 s each (with a 1-s interval between them). On the
study task, 20 pairs were presented once, and 20 pairs were pre-
sented twice. Participants were instructed to learn both then¼30) c. aMCI (n¼30) d. AD (n¼30) signiﬁcant differences (po .05)
77.07 (1.19) 80.03 (1.19) a o(b ¼ c ¼ d)
10/20 7/23
2.10 (.14) 2.03 (.12) a 4(b ¼ c ¼ d)
12.27 (.46) 11.47 (.61) a o(b ¼ c ¼ d)
24.83 (.82) 20.53 (.67) b 4 c 4 d
12.33 (.35) 13.17 (.26)
27.25 (.26) 16.53 (.24) b 4 c 4 d
4.00 (.12) 1.36 (.09) b 4 c 4 d
15.28 (.13) 9.23 (.14) b 4 c 4 d
22.60 (.17) 15.36 (.24) b 4 c 4 d
7.28 (.06) 6.20 (.05) (b ¼ c)4 d
3.37 (.04) 2.20 (.05) (b ¼ c)4 d
27.57 (.32) 15.56 (.38) (b ¼ c)4 d
6.21 (.25) .93 (.10) b 4 c 4 d
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they were told that some pairs would be repeated.
In the recognition phase (self-paced), 60 pairs of stimuli were
presented randomly at the center of a computer screen. The par-
ticipants just had to decide whether or not the two pictures in
each pair had appeared together in the study task; that is, parti-
cipants should only respond “yes” to intact pairs. Of the 60 pairs of
stimuli presented, 10 corresponded to the non repeated intact
condition, 10 corresponded to the repeated intact condition, 10
corresponded to the non repeated rearranged condition (randomly
re-matching the stimuli in a different order from the one studied),
10 corresponded to the repeated rearranged condition, and 20
corresponded to the new condition (pairs of pictures not seen
during the study phase).3. Results and discussion
We began by analyzing false alarms (FA) on new pairs (FAnew;
see Table 2) to analyze whether there were signiﬁcant differences
between groups in their basal FA level. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) comparing the four groups’ means showed that
the effect of the groups variable was signiﬁcant (F3,128¼19.21,
po .0001, η2p¼ .31). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests showed that young
people (mean ¼ .00) made signiﬁcantly fewer FAnew than the
other groups, among which there were no signiﬁcant differences
(means ¼ .14, .23 and .24, for the healthy older, aMCI, and AD
samples, respectively). These results show that the basal level of
FAnew differs between young and older people (both healthy and
patients), which is commonly found in the literature (see, e.g.,
Gallo et al. (2004), Pitarque et al. (2015) and Rhodes et al. (2008)).
Therefore, the following estimates of recollection, familiarity, and
false recognition will have to control the different basal FA levels
in each participant (e.g. Buchler et al., 2011; Light et al., 2004; Prull
et al., 2006).
Recollection was estimated by calculating the individual dif-
ferences between H – FArea (e.g. Cohn et al., 2008; Gallo et al.,
2004; Prull et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 2008; Wolk et al., 2008,
2013), as an index of associative memory because intact and re-
arranged pairs are equally familiar (in both cases, the pictures
were presented for study the same number of times: 1 or 2). A
mixed ANOVA of 4 groups (between subjects)2 repetition con-
ditions (non repeated vs repeated stimuli, within subjects) on re-
collection estimates (see Table 2) showed that the main effects of
both groups and repetition conditions were signiﬁcant
(F3,128¼103.06, po .0001, η2p¼ .71; F1,128¼6.42, po .05, η2p¼ .05,
respectively), indicating that repeated stimuli were betterTable 2
Means (and SE) of hits, false alarms (FA) on rearranged and new pairs, and corrected e
according to the groups and repetition conditions.
YOUNG (n¼42)
HITS Non repeated .75 (.03)
Repeated .90 (.02)
FA REARRANGED Non repeated .12 (.02)
Repeated .09 (.02)
FA NEW .00 (.00)
RECOLLECTION Non repeated .63 (.04)
Repeated .81 (.04)
FAMILIARITY (d′) Non repeated 1.56 (.15)
Repeated 1.95 (.24)
FALSE RECOGNITION Non repeated .12 (.03)
Repeated .09 (.03)recollected than non repeated stimuli (means ¼ .33 and .26, re-
spectively). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing the four groups’
means showed that the recollection capacity declines with healthy
aging (young sample mean ¼ .72 vs healthy older people mean
¼ .26) and with cognitive impairment (as usual in literature; e.g.
Schoemaker et al., 2014): the healthy older people's mean (.26)
differed from both the aMCI mean (.14) and the AD mean (.05),
with no signiﬁcant differences between the latter two groups. One
sample t-tests comparing each of these means against the 0 value
(which indicates a null recollection capacity) conﬁrm a null re-
collection capacity in the AD group (mean ¼ .05; t29¼1.32),
whereas the means of the groups of aMCI (.14) and healthy older
people (.27) differed signiﬁcantly from 0 (t29¼2.98, po .05 and
t29¼5.32, po .001, respectively), which conﬁrms that they have
some recollection capacity. The interaction was not signiﬁcant
(F3,128¼2.24). Overall, the estimated recollection results show a
clear decline in associative memory in both healthy and patholo-
gical aging, as well as a null level of associative memory in AD
patients. These results coincide with what has been published in
recent literature reviews using distinct experimental procedures
(Koen and Yonelinas, 2014; Schoemaker et al., 2014), and they
support the associative-binding deﬁcit hypothesis (Old and Naveh-
Benjamin, 2008), which proposes that older adults’ episodic
memory impairments are partially due to a reduced ability to
encode and retrieve associated/bound units of information.
Familiarity was estimated as the index of discrimination (d′)
between the FArea /(1R) and FAnew (e.g. Cohn et al., 2008; Wolk
et al., 2008, 2013). To calculate these d′ scores, hit rates and FA
rates of 0 and 1 were converted to .02 and .98, respectively, to
avoid inﬁnitely large d′ values (e.g. Cohn et al., 2008; Prull et al.,
2006). Regarding this estimation of familiarity (d′; see Table 2), a
mixed ANOVA 4 groups2 repetition conditions showed sig-
niﬁcant main effects for both the groups variable (F3,128¼12.26,
po .0001, η2p¼ .22) and the repetition conditions (F1,128¼12.51,
p¼ .001, η2p¼ .09), indicating that repeated stimuli yielded more
familiarity-based responses than non repeated stimuli (means
¼1.59 and 1.04, respectively). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests com-
paring the four groups' means showed that familiarity does not
decline with age (young and healthy older people's means ¼1.75
and 1.81, respectively), as the dual-process models propose (Prull
et al., 2006; Yonelinas, 2002). However, it does decline with cog-
nitive impairment, as the mean of healthy older people (1.81)
differs signiﬁcantly from the means of the aMCI and AD patients
(means ¼1.10 and .59, respectively, with no signiﬁcant differences
between them). These means (1.10 and .59) also differ signiﬁcantly
from the 0 value (t29¼5.89, po .0001 and t29¼4.43, po .0001,
respectively), which indicates that both the aMCI and AD patientsstimates of recollection, familiarity discrimination index (d′) and false recognition
HEALTHY OLDER (n¼30) aMCI (n¼30) AD (n¼30)
.65 (.05) .50 (.04) .41 (.05)
.79 (.03) .67 (.05) .49 (.06)
.39 (.04) .40 (.05) .37 (.05)
.53 (.05) .49 (.04) .43 (.05)
.14 (.02) .23 (.04) .24 (.03)
.26 (.04) .11 (.04) .04 (.04)
.27 (.05) .18 (.05) .06 (.05)
1.51 (.18) .71 (.18) .37 (.18)
2.11 (.28) 1.49 (.28) .81 (.28)
.25 (.03) .17 (.03) .13 (.03)
.39 (.03) .26 (.03) .19 (.03)
A. Pitarque et al. / Neuropsychologia 91 (2016) 29–35 33use familiarity efﬁcaciously in recognition. The groups repetition
conditions interaction was not signiﬁcant (F3,128o1), which in-
dicates a constant increase in familiarity with the stimulus re-
petition in the four samples (Tussing and Green, 2001), again
supporting the sensitivity of our procedure for detecting this
manipulation.
Overall, these results clearly show that familiarity, in contrast
to recollection, does not decline with age in healthy aging, as
postulated by the dual-process models (Koen and Yonelinas, 2016;
Prull et al., 2006; Yonelinas, 2002). They also provide cumulative
evidence supporting a preservation of familiarity in healthy aging,
considering the contradictory experimental data found in recent
meta-analytic reviews (Koen and Yonelinas, 2014). For this reason,
various studies propose the possibility of using training in auto-
matized routines (such as implicit or procedural motor-skill
learning) as a compensatory mechanism in elderly populations
with recollection deﬁcits (see e.g. van Halteren-van Tilborg,
Scherder and Hulstijn, 2007). However, our results also clearly
show that familiarity, just like recollection, declines with cognitive
impairment (whether understood as aMCI or AD; e.g. Algarabel
et al., 2009; Wolk et al., 2008, 2013), thus providing cumulative
evidence of a decline in familiarity with cognitive impairment,
considering the contradictory experimental data found in the re-
cent review by Schoemaker et al. (2014). Therefore, our results
support the idea that familiarity deﬁcits, as occurs with recollec-
tion-type deﬁcits, could be used as early markers of pathological
cognitive impairment to discriminate between healthy older
people and people with incipient cognitive impairment (Koen and
Yonelinas, 2014; Wolk et al., 2008, 2013).
Finally, false recognition was estimated as the individual scores
FArea – FAnew (e.g. Abe et al., 2011), which some authors consider
to be an estimation of gist memory (e.g. Budson et al., 2006a;
Hudon et al., 2006). A mixed ANOVA on these false recognition
estimates (see Table 2) showed that the main effects of both
groups and repetition conditions were signiﬁcant (F3,128¼12.64,
po .0001, η2p¼ .23; F1,128¼12.18, p¼ .001, η2p¼ .09, respectively),
indicating that false recognition increases with repetition (means
¼ .17 and .23, for non repeated and repeated pairs, respectively).
Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests comparing the four groups’ means
showed that false recognition increases with healthy aging (young
sample mean ¼ .10 vs healthy older people mean ¼ .32), but de-
creases with cognitive impairment: the healthy older people's
mean (.32) differed from both the aMCI mean (.21) and the AD
mean (.16), with no signiﬁcant differences between the latter two
groups. However, there are no signiﬁcant differences between the
young and AD means (means ¼ .10 and .16, respectively; see below
for an explanation). The interaction was also signiﬁcant
(F3,128¼4.01, po .01, η2p¼ .09). Post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests on this
interaction (see Table 2) showed that repetition increased false
recognition in healthy older people (means of .25 and .39 for non
repeated and repeated pairs, respectively) and aMCI patients
(means of .17 and .26, respectively), but not in young people
(means of .12 and .09, respectively) and AD patients (means of .13
and .19, respectively).
Overall, the results for false recognition show that it clearly
increases with age in healthy older people, coinciding with what
was found in other laboratories (e.g. Buchler et al., 2011; Light
et al., 2004; McCabe et al., 2009; Norman and Schacter, 1997;
Rhodes et al., 2008). This result supports the predictions of the
dual-process models in that elderly people tend to recognize by
drawing more on familiarity than young people do, as this capacity
is maintained with aging, while young people use more the recall-
to-reject strategy to reduce their rates of false alarms (e.g. Cohn
et al., 2008; Gallo et al., 2004). However, false recognition clearly
decreases with cognitive impairment (whether understood as
aMCI or as AD), supporting the idea that these patients also haveless gist memory (e.g. Budson et al., 2006a; Gallo et al., 2006;
Hudon et al., 2006), which coincides with their familiarity deﬁcits,
described above. For this reason, it seems reasonable to suppose
that a signiﬁcant decline in false recognition in older people could
be considered another early marker of cognitive impairment (e.g.
Hildebrant et al., 2009a, 2009b) because it would indicate a sig-
niﬁcant deﬁcit in their gist memory. The fact that young people
and AD patients do not differ on their false recognition rates is
probably due to two different causes: as we mentioned above,
young people show a low rate of false recognition because they
correctly use the recall-to-reject strategy to reduce their false
alarm rates, while the AD patients show low false recognition rates
because they show an overdependence on their impaired gist
memory (Gallo et al., 2006; Hudon et al., 2006). For these two
different reasons, stimulus repetition does not affect the young
people or the AD patients, but it does increase false recognition in
healthy older people and aMCI patients. In the latter two samples,
repetition increases the familiarity of the items, and as these
groups are not able to use the recall-to-reject strategy, an increase
in false recognition is observed (Gallo et al., 2004).
In summary, the experimental paradigm used here has made it
possible to obtain corrected estimations of recollection, familiarity,
and false recognition that could be used as early markers of in-
cipient cognitive impairment in older people. In this regard, var-
ious correlational analyses also support this idea. For example, by
correlating the age of the young participants and healthy older
people (n¼72: 42 young people and 30 healthy older people) with
their familiarity estimations (for non repeated and repeated sti-
muli), we observed null correlations (r ¼ .01 and r ¼ .04, re-
spectively). However, age correlated signiﬁcantly with their re-
collection estimations (r ¼ .64, po .0001, and r ¼ .75,
po .0001, respectively), which indicates that familiarity is not af-
fected by healthy aging, whereas recollection declines with it, as
predicted by the dual-process models (Prull et al., 2006; Yonelinas,
2002). Likewise, in these same samples, the correlation between
age and false recognition was signiﬁcant (r ¼ .43, po .0001, and r
¼ .67, po .0001, for non repeated and repeated stimuli), which
indicates that false recognition increases with age and repetitions,
reinforcing the idea that repetition increases the familiarity of the
rearranged pairs, but only young people are able to counter this
familiarity by recalling the originally studied pairs (recall-to-reject
strategy; Gallo et al., 2004; Light et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2008).
In the same way, the Pearson correlations among our six pre-
dictors, shown in Table 2, and the scores of the 90 elderly people
(30 healthy older people, 30 aMCI, and 30 CE) on the MMSE
(Folstein et al., 1975), probably the most widely used screening
questionnaire, were all positive and signiﬁcant (po .05; with the
exception of false recognition of non repeated stimuli), indicating
that in older people, increases in cognitive impairment are ac-
companied by decreases in their recollection, familiarity, and false
recognition. Overall, these correlational results seem again to
support the predictive capacity of our predictors in the early di-
agnosis of cognitive impairment.
In another vein, it could be argued that our results could be due
to group differences in encoding strategies, some of which might
not be as effective as others. In our experiment, we used the usual
study instructions in the literature on associative recognition,
which stipulate that all the samples have to study the pairs for the
same length of time (e.g. Buchler et al., 2011; Cohn et al., 2008;
Kilb and Naveh-Benjamin, 2011; Rhodes et al., 2008). Other au-
thors, such as Gallo et al. (2004), used a self-paced study task with
intentional learning instructions, where subjects had to say whe-
ther it was “easy” or “hard” to link the two words in each pair (but
that, in turn, presents the possibility that each sample will study
the pairs during signiﬁcantly different periods of time, which
might make study time a new confounding variable). The fact that
A. Pitarque et al. / Neuropsychologia 91 (2016) 29–3534the Gallo et al. (2004) results basically coincide with ours leads us
to consider that our results do not seem to depend on group dif-
ferences in encoding strategies.
On the other hand, a possible limitation of our study (whose
samples come from daily clinical practice) has to do with not using
the physio-pathological (amyloid) or neurodegeneration bio-
markers in all the participants, which would have made it possible
to detect a possible aMCI subgroup that would correspond to
prodromal Alzheimer's disease, according to the criteria of the
International Working Group (Dubois et al., 2007). These patients
without amyloid deposition may not display the expected declines
in familiarity and false recognition if their medial temporal lobe
regions are less affected by the disease's progression. To maximize
the interpretability of our ﬁndings, future studies comparing pa-
tients with positive amyloid biomarkers (e.g. CSF or PET) versus
negative amyloid biomarkers should be performed (Dubois et al.,
2014). This would make it possible to analyze the sensitivity of our
markers in detecting aMCI patients with underlying AD, and in
measuring the changes in disease progression.
To summarize, given the relatively small number of studies that
have investigated familiarity and recollection in individuals with
aMCI and AD (Schoemaker et al., 2014), our study provides cu-
mulative support for considering familiarity and false recognition
deﬁcits as potential early markers of cognitive impairment in el-
derly populations. Our results agree with other recent neu-
roscience results suggesting that familiarity and recollection are
differentially affected by normal aging and AD neuropathology, as
dual-process models propose (see e.g., the model by Schoemaker
at al. (2014) and Wolk et al. (2013)). Whereas recollection is im-
paired through all the stages of healthy aging and disease pro-
gression (due to both age-related and neuropathological changes
in the hippocampal region), familiarity is preserved in normal
aging, which makes older people show an over-reliance on fa-
miliarity to support accurate recognition judgments (e.g. Gallo
et al., 2004). As AD neuropathology progresses, familiarity deﬁcits
begin to appear. Further research using alternative experimental
procedures, estimation procedures, encoding instructions, and
clinical populations (e.g. patients with or without prodromal AD)
is needed before more extensively using these predictors in clin-
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